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7 Global Capital Flows: 
Maximising Benefits, 
Minimising Risks 
JOSEPH P. DANIELS 
Recent events in the world economy have demonstrated that a strengthening 
of the system is needed to maximize the benefits of, and reduce the risks 
posed by, global economic and financial integration. 
- Report of the Finance Ministers to the Koln Economic Summit 
Introduction 
Much has been made of the role of capital flows and financial speculators in 
the context of global integration. Yet in much of the literature on reforms to 
the international financial system, it is taken for granted that the econom ic 
benefits of broader and deeper liberalised financial markets and the economic 
role that speculators play in these markets is well understood. In the early 
I 990s, the industrialised countries, particularly the United States and Europe, 
have unabashedly promoted financial liberalisation as the obvious and 
inevitable policy choice for developing and emerging economies. 
Following the financial crises of 1994 and 1997, however, criticism of 
globalised financial markets for their shortcomings has been unremitting. 
Various policy-making fora have also followed this path, concentrating on 
risks and considering ways in which to contain the level or constrain the pace 
of financial liberalisation and global activities of financial speculators, as 
opposed to promoting the benefits of continued I iberalisation as they once 
had. Because of advances in telecommunications and financial engineering, 
continuing integration of financial markets appears inevitable. 
If history has anything to offer us, as James (1999) argues, liberalisation 
can be reversed. The lack of clear and consistent leadership in international 
economics may explain, in part, the recent surge in isolationism and 
protectionism. Leadership in this complicated issue area requires close 
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attention to the normative and positive aspects of financial libe rali sation in 
order to gain credibility to co-ordinate at the international level and advocate 
at the national level. 
Capital market liberalisation has become an appealing goa l to many 
nations because of the perceived allocative benefits and effic iency gains. The 
risks inherent in this process, however, have been made painfully obv iou 
and, as a result, policymakers have elected to "reform " the financial system -
meaning measures des igned to prevent possible crises and better manage 
those that do occur - so as to maximise said benefits while minimising the 
risks. The overall purpose of this chapter is to offer an understanding of the 
basis for a strengthening or reform of the international financial system and, 
therefore, the rationale behind the preventative reforms advanced by the G7 
Finance Ministers. It seeks to add to the existing literature by identifying and 
discussing, in an accessible manner, the root benefits of capital market 
liberalisation, the risks and imperfections inherent itl capital markets. and the 
constraints that liberalised capital markets place on the conduct of 
m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic po l icies. The role of finan c ial speculators 
in the recent financial crises in East Asian is also cons idered . In tead of 
offering yet another list of reform proposals. this chapter focusses on those 
proposals most likely to be acted upon, that is, those drafted by the G7 
Finance Ministers in Strengthening the International Financial Architecture. 
Report o/the G 7 Finance Ministers to the K61n Economic Summit. Finally, 
as the members of the G7 are the architect of the current international 
financial system, they have key responsibilities in its reform and management. 
We outline these responsibilities in the final section. 
The conclusion drawn here is that the G7 has put forward worthy 
proposals for reducing variability and for responding to and containing future 
crises. These proposals should be acted on with haste. The G7 has fallen 
short, however, in providing the likely victims of future crises. the la rger 
emerging and developing economies, with so lid working proposals and 
examples appropriate to the conditions of these econom ies and broader 
participation in the reform process . The G7 Ministers' report implies that 
market participants will continue to be the principal agents press ing the 
integration of the financial systems of the major developed economies with 
those of the emerging and developing econom ies . Likewise the market wi II 
continue to be the primary supervisor of macroeconomic and exchange rate 
policies, rewarding nations with sound and credible policy and punishing 
those without. Nonetheless, the G7 has key respons ibilities in the reform 
process and in managing these markets . 
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Benefits of International Capital Flows 
Advocates of capital market liberalisation argue that unhindered capita l 
movements a llow savings to flow to their most productive use and, therefore, 
financial speculators play an important and beneficial role as they are the 
agents that provide liquidity, regardless of host location , to projects with 
potentially high marginal products. Those projects that do eventuate in hi gh 
returns reward speculators for the ri sk they have assumed. In thi s way, 
resources are directed in the most efficient pattern , resulting in real sector 
development and productivity increases. Financia l speculators, therefore, take 
the risky s ide ofa financial transaction and provide essentia l liquidity to the 
economy. 
With access to foreign capital, domestic households and bus inesses may 
expand their lending and borrowing activ iti es abroad, a llowing agents to 
continue to spend and invest during domestic economic downturns and repay 
during periods of economic growth, thereby mitigating typical business 
cyc les. Hence, domestic agents can diversify savings internationally and 
reduce their exposure to domestic economic shocks. These positive aspects 
reinforce capita l flows as domestic residents enjoy higher risk-adjusted rates 
of return, spurring yet higher levels of sav ing and investment activity. In turn, 
increased saving and investment induce additiona l economic growth . 
For developing nations in particular, access to globa l capita l reduces the 
cost offinancing investment projects considerab ly. More investment projects 
are undertaken, leading to real sector development. In the long run, this 
translates into higher standards ofliving as higher rates of growth are enjoyed. 
Private specu lative capita l, therefore, may substitute fo r uncertain 
development aid that often comes with inefficiency costs a sociated with 
bureaucratic red tape and constraints. 
The Role of Financial Intermediaries 
For specu lative capita l flows to del iver prom ised real sector development and 
growth, a well-developed system of financial intermediaries is required . 
Pagano ( 1993) identifies three key functions of financial intermed iation that 
lead to economic growth. The first is funnelling savings to firms with 
minimum x-inefficiencies. The process of intermediation absorbs a fraction 
of each dollar of savings so that less than one dollar is invested. An efficient 
system of intermediaries faces low reserve requ irements, transaction taxes and 
unnecessary regulation , reducing these inefficiencies. 
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Secondly, financial intermediaries make it poss ible for many people to 
pool their funds together, thereby increasing the size, or scale. of the amount 
of total amount ofsavings managed by a central authority. This centralisation 
of management can reduce average fund-management costs below the levels 
that savers would incur if they were to manage their savings a lone. thereby 
enjoying financial economies of scale. In thi s way. intermediaries may 
increase the amount of savings ultimately invested by reduc ing unnecessary 
costs. 
Another outcome of an efficient system of intermediaries is the reduction 
of information asymmetries and an improvement of capital allocation and 
market stability. An information asymmetry exists when one party to a 
transaction, say a borrower, has more or better information than does the other 
party, the lender. For financial markets in part icular, information asymmetries 
can lead to a number of potential problems including inefficient allocation of 
avings, herding behaviour. and even financial cr"sis. Intermediaries who 
specialise in the assessment of the quality of debt instruments and 
continuously monitor the performance of firms that issue these instruments 
are able to reduce the degree of information imperfections. 
Intermediaries also provide a means for savers to pool risk. If savers are 
unable to pool risk, they will invest in the most liquid projects. More 
productive but less liquid projects are not financed , resulting in lower 
potential economic growth. Hence, intermediaries playa key three-part role : 
relying on their informational capabilities, they evaluate investment projects 
and determine those with the highest marginal product and then induce savers 
to invest in higher risk but more profitable projects through ri sk sharing at 
reduced average costs. 
Financial Sec/or Developmenl and Economic Growlh 
Reduced costs, higher quality information , and the poo ling of ri sk are onl y 
some of the ways in which intermediaries may affect the rate of aving in an 
economy. Economic theory shows, however, that tinancial sector 
development may either increase or decrease saving and th e effect 0 11 
economic growth is unclear a priori. Improvements in hedg ing instruments 
may reduce precautionary saving and improvements in hou eho ld credit 
markets may allow agents to di ssave in favour of current consumption or low-
marginal-benefit projects. Hence, if financial development induces lower 
sav ing. economic growth Illay suffer. 
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One view on the contribution of the financial sector is that long- run trend 
performance is determined solely by real sector development. An alternative 
view is that the development of the financial sector alters econom ic 
fundamentals and, therefore, alters long-run performance. Why financial 
development evolves differently across econom ies and the casual relationship 
between financial development and real sector growth is still unclear. Recent 
empirical literature, however, supports the view that financial development 
does indeed affect economic growth. Eatwell and Taylor (1998) argue, 
therefore, that the ultimate measure of a system of intermed iaries is the effect 
on the real sector of the economy. 
Misallocation of Capital 
The fact that " reform" of the international financial system is being widely 
discussed is an admittance that unhindered financial markets do not achieve 
the utopian view of effic ient capital allocation expressed above . Such an 
outcome is the quintessence that one would like to see reached , but there are 
a numberofmarket imperfections and policy-created distortions that cause the 
system to fall short. In the presence of a deep and well-regulated system of 
intermediaries, financial development and capital market liberali sation may 
positively affect the path of potential long-run growth. Yet, under lesser 
conditions, intermediaries may channel capital flows in ways that underm ine 
domestic policies, increase shocks and contagion, and trigger financial crises 
(Crockett, 1997, p. 7). The benefits of efficient capital allocation described 
above may be offset and economic growth actually suffer. 
The potential costs of financial crises is well documented in the literature. 
For example, it is believed that the costs of the 1980s banking crisis in 
Argentina equalled one-half of the nation 's GDP, while the United States ' 
bailout of banks during the early 1990s totalled at least US$200 billion . The 
1995 real estate collapse in Japan resulted in the nonperformance of more 
than US$250 billion in bank loans . In South Korea more than 10 percent o f 
all bank loans are nonperforming, and for India and China nonperforming 
loans are estimated to be nearly 20 percent of outstanding loans. Since 1980, 
the International Monetary Fund (1M F) estimates that 133 of 181 1M F 
member nations have suffered banking problems it considers to be 
"s ignificant" (Lindgren, et al. 1996). 
The conclusion is that there are potential allocative and efficiency ga ins 
to be enjoyed from liberalising capital markets . A well-developed and 
regulated system of intermediaries is necessary for these ga ins to be realized. 
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T his is not a sufficie nt cond it ion, however, as there are po licy-c reated 
d istort ions and fi nanc ia l markets imperfectio ns that must be dea lt wi th . Wi th 
th e potenti a l benefits of fin anc ia l specul ati on and the importance of a we ll-
deve loped fin anc ia l market in channe lling g loba l funds outlined. the ri ks and 
po licy constra ints inherent in libera li sed fi nanc ia l markets are cons idered 
next. 
Financial Markets and Economic Policy 
• T here are a number of potenti a l imperfect ions and ri sks inherent in Ii nanc ia l 
markets. It is useful to foc us on th ose th at are centra l to the stabi lity of g loba l 
ca pi ta l markets. For libera li sed ca pita l markets to function at the leve l o r 
practi ca l expectations, m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic po l ic ies must be 
consistent w ith an environment of free- fl owing caiJi ta l. To promote stabili ty 
of the system, these po li cy constra ints must be rea lised and res pected, po li cy-
c reated di sto rtions m inimised, and imperfec tions addressed . 
Risks. Distortions. and Microecol1omic Policy 
O ne ty pe of market imperfecti on, th at of asymmetri c inform ation. is be li eved 
by some economists to pervade tinanc ia lmarkets in part icu lar (E ichengreen, 
e l al. 1999). As di scussed above, asymmetri c information can induce an 
ineffic ient di stribution of capita l and increased market vo latility. Two key 
problems assoc iated wi th inform ation asy mmetries are adverse se lection and 
he rdin g behav iour. In fin ancia l transactions, lenders are often not privy to a ll 
of the info rm at ion - pa rticularly in fo rmation about ri sk - regard ing a ca pita l 
investment proj ect. The ex istence of an inform ation gap between savers and 
borrowers can result in adverse selection. or the potentia l for those who des ire 
funds fo r un worthy projects to be the most like ly to want to borrow or to issue 
debt instruments. A result of adverse se lection is that the iss uance of poor-
qua lity instrum ents can make savers less w illing to lend to o r ho ld debt 
instrum ents issued by those seeking to ti nance high-qua lity pr~iects (Da nie ls 
and VanHoose 1999). Additi ona lly, poor info rmati on may result in he rd ing 
behav iour. T hat is, in the presence of inform ation gaps. avers fo llow the 
behav iour of someone e lse they fee l is bette r inform ed. In a g loba l context, 
he rding behav iour can be a catalyst for contagion and spreading financ ia l 
instability to regional leve ls. Herding behav iour can a lso lead to a red uction 
of asset prices or currency va lues that greatly exceeds what is warranted. 
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I n globa l ca pita l markets, the problem of info rm ati on asymmetri es can be 
extens ive as multinational enterpri ses engage in transacti on spannin g the 
g lobe. High-quality interm ediaries are able to reduce the degree of 
asymmetric information by hav ing offi ces around the world , creating 
economies of sca le in inform ati on process ing. By continuous ly monitorin g 
and evaluat ing the performance and acti v ities of multinationa l enterpri ses, 
they are able to reduce, a lbeit not e liminate, informati on asy mmetri es and 
thereby encourage sav ings and reduce herdin g behav iour. 
Another potenti a l problem is that of moral hazard . that is the borrower 
engages in behav iour that increases ri sk after the debt instrument has been 
purchased. Aga in interm edi aries are able to reduce mora l hazard by 
continuous ly monitoring the perfo rmance of the borrower. In the context of 
g loba l capital markets and in I ight of recent financ ia l c ri ses, mora l hazard may 
a rises when a domestic government implic itly guarantees that a tirm or bank 
will not be a llowed to fa il. Internati onal organisations. such as the I MF. have 
a lso been accused of creating mora l hazard when stand ing by ready to ba i l out 
sovere ign nations facin g a liquidity cris is. . 
Fina lly, capita l fl ows may respond to po li cy-created d istortions. leadin g 
to an inefficient and capric ious a ll ocati on of capita l. Cooper ( 1999) po i nts o ut 
that di ffe renti a l nati ona l taxation, trade restri cti ons. and macroeconom ic 
po lic ies are but a few po licy-created distorti ons that may lead to a 
misallocation of capital. In addition. d ifferenti a l nat iona l regul at ion o n 
financ ia l transactions may generate regulatory arbitrage. when domestic 
institutions e ither locate abroad or conduct certa in types of operations abroad 
in order to avo id domesti c regulati on and supervis ion. This mitigates the 
regulatory abiliti es of governments and exposes domestic inte rm edia ri es to 
the very types of ri sk regulators seek to minimise. These di stortions result 
from domestic microeconomic po lic ies yet need to be judged in an 
internationa l context as we ll. Without proper internati ona l co-operat ion and 
co-ordinati on. there exists a potenti a l " race to the bottom ' or a move to th e 
regulatory and tax environment of the least stringent nati on. 
Financial Markel Liberalisalion and Macroeconomic Policy 
Financ ia l market libera lisati on a lso constra ins macroeconomic po l icy in ways 
determined by the exchange rate reg ime, one of the most important 
macroeconomic institutional cho ices a nation faces . For developing nati ons. 
the exchange rate is an extremely important nominal price that affects export 
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performance. the cost of important commodities and inputs. and directing 
business planning and investment. Peggi ng the exchange rate. therefo re. is an 
attractive option. The well-known " impossible trinity" of lixed exchange 
rates, capital mobility, and discretionary monetary policy prescribes that the e 
three conditions cannot exist s imultaneous ly and po licymakers must be 
willing to forgo one aspect. I For developing, transitional , and emerging 
nations seeking to gain exchange rate stability and domestic price credibility 
through pegged-exchange rates while liberalising financial markets to take 
advantage of cheaper foreign financing, the lesson is that monetary authorities 
must be independent and conduct policy in a manner consistent with the first 
two objectives. This means that discretionary monetary policy via sterilised 
foreign exchange interventions is not sustainable in the long run. The typical 
outcome of countries trying to practice all three is an overvalued currency and 
inevitable devaluation. I n turn, the devaluation focusses attention on the 
improper past conduct of monetary policy and "the loss of credibility is 
dramatic. As a result, the devaluation often leads to a complete collapse of the 
exchange rate regime and eventual floating of the currency until a new trading 
floor is found and the currency stabi I ises . 
Developing nations, therefore, face a dilemma; should they choose fixed 
or flexible exchange rates? Cooper (1999), an advocate of a common world 
currency, see the only practical choices as being flexible exchange rates and 
some type of capital controls or capital market liberali sat ion and strong ly 
fixed exchange rates with the complete loss of di scretionary policy. With 
capital market liberalisation, a developing nation with a flexible exchange rate 
regime wi II experience a high Iy volati Ie exchange rate that responds primari Iy 
to the flow offoreign capital and, as a result, will be driven to capital controls . 
Otherwise, full capital mobility requires these nations to adopt a true fixed 
exchange rate regime with the loss of monetary policy, such as in Hong Kong 
or Argentina. 
A pegged exchange rate regime, such as that employed in Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia prior to the fall of 1997 is problematic in 
combination with capital market liberalisation 2 A key consideration is that 
under a pegged-exchange-rate regime, currency ri sk is shifted. to a given 
degree, from private market participants to the governm ent. To private agents, 
the marginal benefit of employing hedg ing instruments appears less than the 
marginal cost. Many foreign exchange exposures, therefore, go unh edged and 
the foreign currency denominated debt of firms and businesse will balloon 
with a devaluation . According to Cooper, at the point when authorities reali se 
that the exchange rate needs to be devalued so do private market participants 
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and currency spec ul ators, who are able to profit at the expense of nati ona l 
reserves. Further, as fore ign currency indebted bus ines es scramble to buy up 
reserves so a5 to hedge the ir exposure, they exert s ignificant downwa rd 
pressure on the va lue of the dome tic currency. The outcome is a free- fa lling 
exchange value. Thi s is combined with the fact th at the G 7 nations lack an 
exchange rate policy that prov ides for long-te rm stability among the ir 
currencies. What thi s means for deve loping countries that choose to peg to 
one or more of these currenc ies is that eventua lly, a reva luati on or 
devaluation is inev itable. If the conduct of macroeconomic po licy or 
microeconomic reform was wa nting in the interim, or if the adjustment to 
parity was postponed too long, markets are like ly to make these nati ons pay 
harshly for the ir shortcomings. 
Another concern regarding fin anc ia l libera li sation, somewhat separate 
from the cho ice o f exchange rate regime, is the potentia l loss of monetary 
contro l. As po inted out by Williamson and Mahar ( 1998), nati ons that 
practi sed monetary policy through capital control s typically do not have any, 
or least not we ll-developed, money and bond markets. Remov ing these 
control s leaves authorities with no means to control monetary growth through 
open-market operati ons. Eventually libe ra li sati on leads to the deve lopment of 
governm ent securities markets and moneta ry contro l is re to red . The 
transi tion period, however, may prove to be quite unstable, prov iding one 
ex planati on of why many nations experi ence a fin ancia l c ri s is fo llow ing 
libera li sation. 
The Role of Foreign Capital in Recent Crises 
Before moving on to cons ider the appropriateness of reforms, it is impol1ant 
to first cons ider the ro le of fore ign speculators. At the time of the East As ian 
cri s is, Malays ian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad blamed fo re ign 
speculators for the fi nanc ia l c ri s is that engulfed the region, sparking a bi tter 
debate with the likes of George Soros. Did fore ign spec ulators truly ca use the 
fin anc ia l cri s is in the ir bl ind pu rsuit of profit , 'a some c la imed? O r, as a rgued 
by other, was it the result of improper macroeconom ic and m icroeconom ic 
po li c ies? 
Now that some time has passed s ince the sta rt of the East As ia n c ri s i , 
empirical assessments of the cri s is are beginning to materia li se . Though the 
evidence so fa r is rather scant, it SuppOI1S the noti on that fore ign speculators 
were 110 1 the cause of the cris is. One of the most recent studies, by Clloe, Kilo, 
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and Stulz ( 1999), cons iders the ro le of fo re ign investors in the co ll ap e of the 
Ko rean stock market in 1997. The authors show that the market adjusted 
qui ckly to sales by fore ign in vesto rs and that negati ve abnorm al returns were 
not pers istent fo llowing fo re ign sa les. T he auth ors prov ide ev idence of 
herdin g behav iour by fo re ign in vestors but convinc ingly a rgue that uch 
behaviour need not be destabili s ing. The ir results show that domesti c buy ing 
activity dominated fo re ign se lling activity in the last three months of 1997. 
Hence, there is no ev idence that fore ign speculators were a destabi I is ing fo rce. 
Regardin g Tha iland , Lauridsen ( 1999) conc ludes that pri vate sector 
intermediaries m ishand led short-te rm capita ls fl ows lead ing to a m isa ll ocation 
i of capital. Tho ugh, in the author's opinion, thi s is the main cause of the cri ses, 
it was accompan ied by po l iti ca l instabi I ity and mismanagement. Jomo ( 1999) 
concludes th at the re li ance on short-term finan c ing, specul ati on aga inst the 
currency- basket peg, and injudic ious po l icy response led to the co llap e of 
the Ma lays ian rin gg it. The " Tequila C ri ses" o f 1994- 1995 is exa mined in a 
spec ia l vo lume of the Journal of Banking and Finance, edited by Ca lom iri s 
( 1999). Though the rev iew o f the lite rature on thi s epi sode shows some 
disagreement on the ro le of specul ato r , what is apparent is that is was 
problems in macroeconomic and microeconomic fund amenta ls th at made 
Mexico "vulnerable to the whims of specul ato rs" (p. 145 8). 
Finally, in a theoretica l context, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Bane ~j ee ( 1999) 
show that econom ies at an interm ediate leve l of fin anc ia l deve lopment a re 
more unstable than economies w ith e ithe r fully deve loped o r underdeveloped 
fin ancial markets. As a result, inte rmedi ate economies that undergo fin anc ia l 
libe ra li sati on may destabili se the ir economies . Fore ign direct in vestm ent, 
however, is not destabili s ing. The authors suggest, therefo re, th at economies 
w ith finan c ial markets at an intermediate stage of deve lopment should 
carefull y plan and pace finan c iallibera li sation, all owin g FDI but re tri cting 
portfolio fl ows. The importance of creating incenti ves fo r FDI is add res ed 
by Alan Rugman in a later chapter of thi s text. 
Hence, the I iterature suggests that the sources of these fin anc ia l cri ses li es 
in the mi x of inappropriate macroeconomic po li cy and inadequate 
microeconomic reform coupl ed w ith capita l market libera li sati on. as oppo ed 
to fo re ign specul ati on. Wheth er one blame pecul ato rs, the conduct of 
m ic roeconom ic and macroeconom ic po l ic ies. o r the leve l o f tinanc ia I 
deve lopment for the fin anc ia l cri es of th e 1990s, the prev ious secti on or lh i 
chapter demonstrate the overarching importance of a we ll-deve loped. hi gh-
qu a lity system of finan c ia l inte rmedi aries. F inanc ia l inte rm edi ari es ex ist to 
save potentia l ho lders o f fin anci a l in struments from incurrin g the ri sks and 
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a ll owing them to enjoy red uced costs. the reby enco uragi ng financial 
speculat ion in the most effic ient sectors of the economy. In tUI'll . speculators 
provide the most promi sing sectors of the eco nomy w ith the li quidity needed 
to deve lop and expand. Whil e these institutions cannot e lim inate adver e 
se lecti on and mora l hazard problems. they can co ll ect in fo rmation about the 
underly ing ri skiness of fin anc ia l in struments and monito r the cont inuing 
perfo rmance of those who issue such instrum ents, the reby reduc ing the extent 
of these problems in fi nanc ia l markets . 
Preventative Policy: G7 Recommendations 
With the benefi ts and risks of unh indered cap ita l flows cons idered. what type 
and to what extent shoul d reform effo rts take? Shou ld th ere be a new 
internat iona l fina nc ia l archi tecture. o r should reforms be modest? Eichengreen 
( 1999, p. 9) makes a compe lling, though blun t, argument aga inst proposa ls 
that are too grandiose. c la iming th at they are impract ica l and have " not ' a 
snowba ll ' s chance in he ll of be ing implemented". G iven the complex and 
dy namic nature of the system, one must rea li e that the re is no definiti ve 
answer to the quest ions proposed here. Thus. the re w ill be cons ide rab le 
d isagreement on reforms that are complex and broad sweep ing. As such. 
grand proposa ls are non-starters in the current po li t ica l environment. 
As stated at the outset of thi s chapte r. th e objective of po l icy and reform 
shou ld be to max imise the benefits w hil e m inimis ing the risks assoc iated with 
capita l market libe ra li sation. The li terature has shown that libera lisat ionneed 
to be paced accordin g to the level of fi nancia l deve lopment the nat ion fi nds 
itse lf at. Mic roeconomic po li cy act ions should free trade fl ows. encourage 
fl ex ibili ty and competition, and improve regul ation and supervis io n o f the 
nation s system of interm edi aries. T he deepenin g of the market fo r 
government debt is essent ia l fo r contro lling the money supply and a llowing 
for d irect fi nanc ing. The ability to fi nance directly reduces the impact of 
banking c rises on the real secto r of the economy and prov ides ~or long-run 
stabili ty. . 
In eva luat ing the GTs proposa ls des igned to prevent po ible future 
cri ses, thi s section reviews those put fo rward in the Report of the Finance 
M inisters to the K6 1n Economic Summi t ( ee the append ix fo r the full text of 
the Report). Beginning in Ha li fax and continuing in Lyon. the Finance 
Ministe rs were requested by the leaders to identi fy key areas o f reform in the 
in ternat iona l fin anc ia l system and to report on in iti ati ves prior to the summ its. 
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The Ka ln Report. therefo re. is a doc um ent that has been in construction to r 
four years and has evo lved along the way. It a ll ows fo r a comprehensive v iew 
of the Fi nance Mini sters ' assessment of the state of the internationa l fi nanc ia l 
system. refo rms that have taken place. and proposa l to date. ' T he report. 
however, is not necessarily a set of po li cy commitments. Rath er it is a 
proposal prepared fo r the G7 leaders ' cons iderati on. Noneth e le s. it prov ides 
a useful means fo r eva luating the types and like lihood of re to nn to the 
system. 
After rev iewing the report. the ro le of the G7 as a body of g loba l 
govern ance in the context of the inte rnati ona l fi nanc ia l system is con ide red. 
In light of the centra li ty of the G7, the dominance of th e G7 economie in 
g loba l trade and capita l fl ows, and the fac t that the G7 nations were the 
a rchitects of the current system. a set of responsibilitie is put fo rwa rd. 
Fulfilment of these respons ibiliti es is critica l to the success a we ll -functionin g 
g loba l fin ancia l system. • 
General Overview ()fAssessment and Proposals 
The report of the Finance Mini sters re fl ects we ll the work that has ta ken place 
s ince Ha li fax. The document addresses the key areas of strengthe nin g and 
reforming internati ona l fin anc ia l in stitu t ions ( IFls): enhanc ing transparency 
and promoting best practices, strengthenin g financ ia l regul ation in ind ustri al 
countr ies, strengthening macroeconomic po li c ies and financ ia l system in 
emerg ing markets, improv ing c ri s is prevention and in vo lvi ng th e pri vate 
sector. and promotin g soc ia l po li c ies. At 28 pages in length it i indeed 
comprehensive in its assessment and long in recommend ati ons. The report 
reads a a text on va rious refo rm s implemented. recommended. and proposed 
fo r furthe r study. It does an exce ll ent job of framing th e current s ituat ion in 
the most genera l sense. The overa ll qua lity of the doc um ent reflects the 
effic ient workings of the G7 Finance Mini sters' meetin gs and the competence 
of the current mini sters and the ir staffs. 
The report makes it c lear that no new intern ationa l o rgani sations are 
needed (a po int w hi ch is emphas ised aga in be low). T he theme of th e report 
is that fo r internati ona l fi nanc ia l markets to work prope rly. enhanced 
tra nsparency and di sclosure as we ll as improved regul ati on and supervis ion 
are necessary. In vo lvement of the pri vate sector in cri sis management and 
prevention, as we ll as requirin g the pri vate secto r to bear respons ibili ty fo r 
ri sk ass umed, is a lso emphas ised . 
Some ofthe key recommendati on a re that the 1M F and Worl d Bank need 
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not only co-operate, but need also to forge a clear di vision of responsibilities 
between the two. Improved and increased transparency and accountabili ty of 
these institutions and other IFl s is pressed. Invo lvement of develop ing and 
emerging nations is limited to the New Arrangements to Borrow (NA B), the 
Interim Committee of the IMF, and the new Financial Stabi li ty Forum .4 A 
number of other proposa ls are made for reformin g and improv ing the ex isting 
I Fls. We leave these to the experts in policy architecture to gauge their merit. 
The Ministers report opens by stat ing that a "we ll -fu nct ioning 
international financial system is essential to a llow an effic ient a llocation of 
globa l sav ings and investment, and provide the conditions needed to improve 
world-wide growth and living standards in all countries". In the process, it is 
made clear that policy responsibility still rests with national authorities and 
what is envisioned is international co-operation rather than international 
regulation. International institutions, pal1icularly the IM F and the World 
Bank, are asked to improve perfo rm ance in core responsibili ties. increase 
transparency, clearly del ineate responsibi I ities, and co-operate rather than 
increase their scope of regulatory and supervisory acti vities . . 
Risk Management 
Much attention is given to ri sk assessment. a challenging task in today 's 
environment ofsophisticated financial engineering. Banks and other tinancial 
intermediaries are the focus of reform, given the important role they play in 
filling information gaps and allocating capita l. The reforms of the Basel 
Committee are held as the standard that a ll countries should consider for 
domestic implementation. Unf0l1unately, the rev isions have come under fire 
for not doing enough and not being particularly useful to develop ing country 
systems. Developing nations have argued that they would be at the mercy of 
rati ng agencies, and though the new standards might ti ghten contro ls over 
banks in developed nations. may very we ll hurt banks in their nations (Diaz. 
2000). Clearly the emphas is is minimisi ng market imperfect ions and 
improv ing supervision of financial instituti? n acti vity rather than regulating 
it. 
Capital controls are suggested for developing nations onl y as a transitory 
too l while the financial sector develops and supervisory abi l iti es improve. The 
purpose is to limit unhedged short-term borrowing of developing country 
banks. Though not a first-choice policy instrument. the views of the finance 
ministers are consistent with the literature suggesti ng that financial 
deve lopment is a necessary condition for stab ility and foreign direct 
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investment (FDI) is preferred to short-term capital flows. as FD I is not 
destabilising. Eichengreen ( 1999) argues that such taxes are indeed warranted 
in certain cases, but that they are a third-choice, where improvements in ri sk 
management and regulatory abilities are the first and second choices. The 
problem with capital controls is that they reduce the pressures on po licy 
makers to implement the first and second choices. Further, as the report states, 
they have not been a very effective instrument in most cases. 
Private Sector Bail- In and Involvement 
, Pri vate sector bail-in, that is hav ing pri vate sector investors as ume 
responsibility for ri sk undertaken, is not only a critical com ponent of crisis 
management but also crisis prevention, as clear terms for bai I-in wou Id reduce 
moral hazard. By forcing private sector participants to bear the financial 
consequences of their investment decisions through ehanges in debt financing 
and the reduction of domestic and international safety nets, ex ante 
expectations are changed and, it is assumed, a more conservative approach to 
risk will be adopted . 
The report outlines a framework that recommends linking offic ial support 
to the country 's programme of meeting its debt obligations, balancing classes 
of debt holders if the debt is to be restructured. estab li shing a reserve tloor fo r 
private sector contributions in relation to offic ial contributions and all owi ng 
lending into arrears and the use of payment suspensions and capita l contro ls 
in "exceptional" cases. The report further states that no category of private 
creditors (bondholders) should be viewed as senior to any other group 
(banks). It concludes, however, with an acknowledgement that the general 
approach will remain to be applied on a case-by-case basis. This refl ects the 
disagreement that exists between, primarily, the Americans and other G7 
members on how to bail in private bondholders. Because bonds do not 
typically contain collective action clauses, rescheduling of thi s type of debt 
is difficult, if possible at all. This has led to a mistaken belief that bondholder 
ri ghts are held higher than those of other debt holders (The Economist. 1999). 
The problem with these types of provisions, as we ll as standst i II arrangements 
and exchange controls, is that they may reduce the quality of the debt 
in trument. Because of this, some have argued that they may actually create 
an unstable environment that is conducive to a financial cri sis. 
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Co-ordinaliol1 of Reform 
Private sector :nvolvement in crises prevention is also called for. Little detail 
is forthcoming on how to accomplish this, however. Eichengreen (1999, p. 7) 
points out the obstacles to I MF-Ied standard setting and the need to rely on 
private sector expertise as the "only practical way of promulgating effective 
standards in the relevant areas". The number and variety of agencies involved 
in financial architecture reform is quite expansive. In an attempt to categorise 
the various bodies, the agencies and organisations mentioned explicilly in the 
report are grouped according to their affiliation with international 
organ isations, private sector organ isations, and the G7. 
Those directly affiliated with the G7, or created by the G7, are the: 
Financial Action Task Force, created by the G7 at the 1989 Paris Summit and 
includes 26 member countries; G7 Financial Experts Group on Supervision 
and Regulation in the Financial Sector: and the G7 Working Group on 
Financial Crime. International organisations and affiliate bodies are: the 
World Bank; the IM F; the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB); the Interilil 
Committee or International Financial Monetary Committee: the IMF / World 
Bank Development Committee; the Financial Sector Liai on Committee 
(FSLC): the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme 
(FSAP); the United Nations (UN), and the Organisation for Economic 0-
operation and Development (OECD). Private sector-based bodies and 
affiliates are; the BIS ; the Paris Club; the BIS Committee on the Global 
Financial System (CGFS); the Financial tability Forum chaired by Andrew 
Crockett, General Manager of the BIS and supported by a small secretariat at 
the BIS; the Counter-party Risk Management Group; the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions ( IOSCO); the Internationa l 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC); the Internationa l Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS); the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerate 
(Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS); and the Core Principle Methodology 
Working Group (Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS). 
Far from being an exhaustive list. the above is merely a subset of the 
bodies involved in reforming the financial ·architecture. It does illu trate, 
however, the Finance Ministers ' point that no new international body i 
needed . Rather what is essential for success is overall management of the 
process that is already in motion . 
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Exchange Rale Management: A Special Problem 
As di scussed earli er, the appropriate approach to exchange rate management 
is a perplexing problem and continues to be an area of practi ca l disagreement. 
Many emerging nations choose to peg the va lue of their currency relati ve to 
a vehic le currency because of their dependence on do lla r-pri ced bas ic 
commodities, to gain credibility and convertibility, to redu ce transaction 
costs, thereby promoting trade and in vestment, and as a means of fight ing 
inflation. There are, however, two practi ca l problems with rig id exchange rate 
reg imes.s The first is that they require adopting nati ons to subjugate monetary 
J po li cy to exchange rate management rather than domestic objectives . Ma ny 
nations res ist thi s by steril is ing exchange rate interventions, a practice that 
cannot be susta ined. Hence, in the long run the conduct of macroeconom ic 
po licy is often inconsistent with the exchange rate reg ime. The second i that 
it encourages unhedged borrowing, as di scussed earlier. 
The finance mini sters ' pos it ion is that the exchange rate regime must be 
backed by consistent macroeconomic po lices . Further, they judge that the 
internati ona l community should not prov ide offic ia l fin anc ing to countri es 
that peg thei r exchange ra te unless the exchange va lue is susta inable and 
"certa in conditions" are met. The report is not firm on thi s issue and no 
a lternative reg imes are offered deve loping countri es. Experience shows th at 
basket-pegs and s ingle-currency-pegs will continue to be a popu lar cho ice 
among deve loping country po licymakers. They are. however. d iffic ult to 
susta in when the G7 nati ons do not co-ordinate on the ir own exchange va lues. 
What thi s means fo r deve loping countr ies that choose to peg to one or more 
of these currencies is that, eventua lly, a reva luat ion or deva luat ion must be 
made. I f macroeconomic po licy or microeconomic reform were wanting in the 
interim, or if the adjustment to parity were postponed too long, markets are 
like ly to make these nati ons pay harshly for the ir shortcomings. This was the 
case for East Asian countries such as Thai land, Ma lays ia, and Indones ia, 
which pegged or managed their currencies aga inst a basket that attached a 
la rge we ight to the US do lla r. 
Emerging G7 Responsibilities 
Fischer (1999) po ints out that the reform of the internationa l fi nancia l 
arch itecture rea lly means m icroeconom ic and macroeconom ic corrections 
undertaken by the deve loping nati ons - the rec ipients of capita l tl ows - the 
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deve loped nati ons - th e o ri g inators of ca pita l fl ows - and IFls. C lea rly the 
po ints of emphas is in the G7 report, banking refo rm and increased 
transparency fo r example, are required by a ll pa rti c ipants of the system, but 
are primarily directed at the rec ipient nati ons. What is the ro le of the G7 as an 
institution with g loba l leadership respons ibilities? 
T he G7 nations are in a unique pos ition in regard to the new fi nanc ia l 
architecture. They are the architects of the current system, as deta il ed by 
Nicho las Bayne in Chapter 2. They a lso dominate global markets in term s of 
trade and capita l fl ows, and are the issuers of the world 's vehi c le currenc ies. 
T hey have, therefore, spec ia l respons ibiliti es fo r its reform . Based on the 
po ints put fo rward in th is chapte r, the fo ll owing 7 ro les fo r the G7 are 
suggested. 
1. Actively Serve as the New Financial Architecture ',\' (jeneral Contractor 
The G7 should co-ordinate and set agendas, establish time lines for resul ts, 
and make recommendations for research. As an institution, the G7 does not 
have any " turf' issues w ith other organi sations, it is not an agent of any 
organi sation (other than the leaders themse lves), and can exerc ise 
considerable contro l over many instituti ons such as the IMF. Being at the 
centre of the process, the G7 Mini sters must take respons ibili ty fo r co-
ordinating the process, serve as the dri ving fo rce fo r implementati on, and act 
as the lead ing advocates of the benefits of capita l market I ibera li sation. 
2. Co-ordinate and/or Co-operate among Themselves 
The G7 must active ly co-operate, and when practica lly feas ible, co-ord inate 
microeconomic and macroeconomic po lices . Co-operati on is needed on 
microeconomic polic ies, such as fin anc ia l market regul at ions and taxes so as 
not to create di storti ons that lead to an ineffi c ient flow of ca pita l. Co-
ordination on debt-holder c lauses is needed s ince no country will unil atera lly 
adopt such c lauses and run the ri sk of lowerin g the qu a l ity of th e ir debt. 
Macroeconomic co-operation is need to ma inta in a environment conduc ive to 
sta ble capita l fl ows, inc ludi ng exchange rate stabili ty and the avo ida nce of 
unsusta inable exte rna l defic its. 
3. Encourage Competition 
T he G7 must encourage compet it ion, parti cul arly Illult i late ra I trade 
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liberali sation and the Multilateral Agreement on In ve tment (MA l). As 
discussed earlier, trade liberali sation is a precursor to financialliberali ation. 
Without it, di tortions ex ist that result in the ineffic ient di stribution of capital 
with bubbles resulting in particular sectors of the economy. Competition is 
al 0 required in the banking sectors of both developed and deve lop ing nat ions 
to ensure a hea lthy system of intermediaries. 
-I. Encourage and Allow jar Broader Participation 
The G7 should, and will, remain an exc lusive club. It should all ow. however 
and whenever appropriate, broader participation. Inclusion of the developing 
and emerging nations will enhance the credibility of reforms that are 
forthcom ing from the process and give these nations ome "ownership" of the 
process. These two aspects are certainly needed to summon the political will 
for change, given the current backlash that ex ists ~a inst integrati on. and the 
political will to endure in the midst ofa cri is . 
5. Continue Work on Standards 
Because of the dynamic nature of financial markets, financial engineering, 
and the activities of multinational enterprises, appropriate standards and best 
practices are not static. The G7 is the body that must see that work on 
transparency. corporate governance, and ri sk management standards 
continues, even though stab ility may temporarily return. 
6. Provide Incentives 
Many of the reform measures mentioned above require major change and 
unilateral adoption by developing nations. The G7 must encourage the ir 
adoption by providing incentives and rewards for those countries that conform 
and maintain compliance. The Council on Foreign Relations (1999, p. 172) 
refers to this as "Rewards for joining the Good Housekeeping Club". These 
incentives would include conditioning lending terms with performance and 
reducing regulatory capital req uirements for banks. The G7 mu I also avoid 
generati ng market distortions through its own regulato ry action . uch a the 
tandards for capital requirements are a ll eged to have done. 
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Do Not Over-Advertise 
The G7 must avo id overstating, o r a ll owing to be overstated, the beneti ts of 
modest reform measures such as improved transparency and survei ll ance. 
Financ ial cri ses w ill occas iona lly occur; that is the nature of the beast. 
Overstating the effects reduces the credibility o f reform efforts in th e eyes of 
the most shrewd market participants whil st understating the ex i ting market 
risk to those participants less savvy. 
The internati onal fin anc ial architecture is a public good and. the refore. its 
reform affects many nati ons outs ide of the G7. G iven the centra lity of the G7 
in g loba l governance, however, the G7 fi nds itse lf in a unique pos it ion o r 
respons ibility . The seven respons ibilities outlined above const itute an 
important ro le fo r the G7 Ministers. Meeting these obligations is critica l for 
a credibl e and ba lanced approach to strengthening the intern ati ona l fi nanc ia l 
a rch itecture. 
Conclusion 
Capita l market liberalisation offers deve loping nations the cap ita l neces ary 
fo r growth and increased standards ofl iving. Increas ing capita l mobili ty i the 
means fo r more effic ient capi ta l a ll ocation and wo rld-wide economic ga ins 
that resul t. These benefits, however, are accompani ed by ri sks that pervade 
fi nanc ia l markets. The appropriate approach to reform of the in te rn ati ona l 
fin anc ia l a rch itecture is one that seeks to max im ise the benetits wh i Ie 
minimis ing the ri sks. 
The Report of th e Finance Ministers to the Ko ln Econom ic Summ it is a 
li ving document th at refl ects the e fforts of the G7 and various inte rn ati o na l 
and domestic organi sations reform efforts s ince the Ha lifax Summit in 1995 . 
T he recommendations conta ined in the re port are conservative in nature and. 
in cases where di ffe rences in opin ion remain , mainta in a market-o riented 
approach. As such, few deta il s are given, makin g implementation in ma ny 
areas more di ffic ult. Further, as re fl ected ' in the report, a vast num ber of 
organi sations, agenc ies, and comm ittees are in vo lved in the proce 's and 
overa ll co-ord ination presents a dau nting task. Noneth e less, appropriate 
private sector ex perti se is inc luded in forming accountin g and audi t ing 
standards, and standards fo r supervis ion, regul at ion, transparency. private 
sector invo lvement, and ri sk management a re th e core e lements needed for 
effect ive reform . The most important cha ll enge that the G7 now face is to co-
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ordinate the process and , as stated in 
implementation". The endurance of the G7 
determine the success or failure of reform. 
Notes 
the report, ··to encourage 
in this regard wi ll ultimately 
See Jeffrey A. Frankel ( 1999) for an excellent and intuiti ve di scuss ion on this issue. 
2 See Daniels. ToumanotT. and von der Ruhr ( 1999) for a di sl:ussionof the currency-
basket-peg arrangements and estimates of their currency wcights lur these nations. 
3 Till: reliability of communiques as a public record of policy intentions is now IV<!II 
established in the literature. t!.g .. von Furstenberg and Daniels. 1992. 
4 I-Icncc. we concur with Duncan Wood 's position in Chapter 4 that much more lH:eds 
to be done to include the likely candidates of the next signilicant cri sis. the large 
developing nations experiencing linancialliberali sation and tinancial development. 
5 In addition to the tlVO papers on this subject that appear in this text. sec Eichengreen 
e f al. (1999) lor an analys is of the probl'em of transition Irom one regime to anothcr. 
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